We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this endeavor is differential privacy: we give an algorithm that coordinates a stable matching using differentially private signals, which lead to our truthfulness guarantee. This is the first setting in which it is known how to achieve nontrivial truthfulness guarantees for students when computing school optimal matchings, assuming worstcase preferences (for schools and students) in large markets.
Introduction
In this paper we consider the important problem of computing many-to-one stable matchingsa matching solution concept used for diverse applications, including matching students to schools [Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009] , and medical residents to hospitals [Roth, 1984, Roth and Peranson, 1999] . There are two sides of such a market, which we will without loss of generality refer to as the students and the schools. The goal is to find a feasible assignment µ of students to schools -each student a can be matched to at most 1 school, but each school u can be potentially matched to up to C u students, where C u is the capacity of school u. We would like to find a matching that is stable. Informally, when each student a has a preference ordering ≻ a over schools, and each school u has a preference ordering ≻ u over students, then an assignment µ forms a stable matching if it is feasible, and there is no student-school pair (a, u) such that they are unmatched (µ(a) = u), but such that they would mutually prefer to deviate from the proposed matching µ and match with each other.
The set of stable many-to-one-matchings have a remarkable structural property: there exists a school optimal and a student optimal stable matching -i.e. a stable matching that all schools simultaneously prefer to all other stable matchings, and a stable matching that all students simultaneously prefer to all other stable matchings. Moreover, these matchings are easy to find, with the school-proposing (respectively, student proposing) version of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm [Gale and Shapley, 1962] . Unfortunately, the situation is not quite as nice when student incentives are taken into account. Even in the 1-to-1 matching case (i.e. when capacities C u = 1 for all schools), there is no mechanism which makes truthful reporting of one's preferences a dominant strategy for both sides of the market [Roth, 1982] . In the many-to-one matchings case, things are even worse: an algorithm which finds the school optimal stable matching does not incentivize truthful reporting for either the students or the schools [Roth, 1984] .
Because of this, a literature has emerged studying the incentive properties of stable matching algorithms under large market assumptions (e.g. [Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005 , Lee, 2011 , Kojima and Pathak, 2009 ). In general, this literature has taken the following approach: make restrictive assumptions about the market (e.g. that students preference lists are only of constant length and are drawn uniformly at random), and under those assumptions, prove that an algorithm which computes exactly the school optimal stable matching makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for a 1 − o(1) fraction of student participants (generally even under these assumptions, the schools still have incentive to misreport if the algorithm computes the school optimal stable matching).
In this paper we take a fundamentally different approach. We make absolutely no assumptions about student or school preferences, allowing them to be worst-case. We also insist on giving incentive guarantees to every student, not just most students. We compute (in a sense to be defined) an approximately stable and approximately school optimal matching using an algorithm with a particular insensitivity property (differential privacy), and show that truthful reporting is an approximately dominant strategy for every student in the market. These approximations become perfect as the size of the market grows large. Our notion of a "large market" requires only that the capacity of each school C u grows with (the square root of) the number of schools, and (logarithmically) with the number of students, and does not require any assumption on how preferences are generated.
Our Results and Techniques
We recall the standard notion of stability in a many-to-one matching market with n students a i ∈ A and m schools u j ∈ U , each with capacity C j . Definition 1. A matching µ : A → U is feasible and stable if: 1. (Feasibility) For each u j ∈ U , |{i : µ(a i ) = u j }| ≤ C j 2. (No Blocking Pairs with Filled Seats) For each a i ∈ A, and each u j ∈ U such that µ(a i ) = u j , either µ(a i ) ≻ a i u j or for every student
(No Blocking Pairs with Empty Seats) For every u j ∈ U such that |µ −1 (u j )| < C j , and for every student
Our notion of approximate stability relaxes condition 3. Informally, we still require that there be no blocking pairs among students and filled seats, but we allow each school to possibly have a small number of empty seats. We view this as a mild condition, reflecting the reality that schools are not able to perfectly manage yield, and are often willing to accept a small degree of under-enrollment.
Definition 2 (Approximate Stability). A matching µ : A → U is feasible and α-approximately stable if it satisfies conditions 1 and 2 ( Feasibility and No Blocking Pairs with Filled Seats) and:
3. (No Blocking pairs with Empty Seats at Under-Enrolled Schools) For every u j ∈ U such that |µ −1 (u j )| < (1 − α)C j , and for every student
We also employ a strong notion of approximate dominant strategy truthfulness, related to first order stochastic dominance -informally, we say that a mechanism is η-approximately dominant strategy truthful if no agent can gain more than η in expectation (measured by any cardinal utility function consistent with his ordinal preferences) by misreporting his preferences to the mechanism.
Finally, we, define a notion of school optimality that applies to approximately stable matchings. Informally, we say that an approximately stable matching µ (in the above sense) is school dominant if when compared to the school optimal exactly stable matching µ ′ , for every school u j , every student a i matched to u j in µ is strictly preferred by u j to any student matched to µ j in µ ′ but not in µ.
We can now give an informal statement of our main result.
Theorem 1 (Informal).
There is an algorithm for computing feasible and α-approximately stable school dominant matchings that makes truthful reporting an η-approximate dominant strategy for every student in the market, under the condition that for every school u, the capacity is sufficiently large, e.g.
Remark 1. Note that no assumptions are needed about either school or student preferences, which can be arbitrary. The only large market assumption needed is that the capacity C u of each school is large. If, as the market grows, school capacities grow with the total number of schools at a rate of Ω(m 1/2+ε ) for any constant ε, then both η and α can be taken to tend to 0 in the limit.
This result differs from the standard large market results in several ways. First, and perhaps most importantly, the result is worst-case over all possible preferences of both schools and students. Second, the guarantee states that no student may substantially gain by by misreporting her preferences; previous results [Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005, Kojima and show that only a subconstant fraction of students might have (substantial) incentive to deviate. In exchange for these strong guarantees, we relax our notion of stability and school optimality to approximate notions, which can be taken to be exact in the limit as the market grows large (under the condition that school capacities grow at a sufficiently fast rate).
When we do make one of the assumptions on student preferences made in previous work, we get stronger claims than the one above. For example, when the length of the preference lists of students are taken to be bounded, as they are in Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] and Kojima and Pathak [2009] we can remove our dependence on the number of schools:
Theorem 2 (Informal). Under the condition that all students have preference lists over at most k schools (and otherwise prefer to be unmatched), there is an algorithm for computing feasible and α-approximately stable school dominant matchings that makes truthful reporting an η-approximate dominant strategy for every student in the market, under the condition that for every school u, the capacity is sufficiently large:
Remark 2. Note that if k is considered to be a constant, then this result requires school capacity to grow only poly-logarithmically with the number of students n.
Our results come from analyzing a differentially private variant of the classic deferred acceptance algorithm. Rather than having schools explicitly propose to students, we consider an equivalent variant in which schools u publish a set of "admissions thresholds" which allow any student a who is ranked higher than than the current threshold of school u (according to the preferences of u) to enroll. These thresholds naturally induce a matching when each student enrolls at their favorite school, given the thresholds. We first show that if the thresholds are computed under the constraint of differential privacy, then the algorithm is approximately dominant strategy truthful for the students. We then complete the picture by deriving a differentially private algorithm, and showing that with high probability, it produces an approximately stable, school dominant matching.
Related Work

Incentives in Stable Matching
Stable matching has long been known to be incompatible with truthfulness: no algorithm which produces a stable matching is truthful for both sides of the market [Roth, 1982] , though GaleShapley is known to be truthful for the side of the market which is proposing in the 1-to-1 setting. Several lines of work have investigated stable matching in large markets, where players' preferences are drawn from some distribution, and considering properties of the market as n, the number of players, grows large. Much of this work reduces to arguing that few players will have more than one stable match; since only those players who have multiple stable matchings ever have incentive to misreport, this directly implies most players will have no incentive to misreport. For a tabular representation of the related work in terms of the expected number of stable matches an individual has under various assumptions, see Table 1 .
Let D be a fixed distribution over the set of n women. Consider the following process of generating length-k preference lists over women. Draw some w 1 ∼ D, and let w 1 be the first woman in a preference list. Now, let (w 1 , . . . , w i−1 ) be the first (i − 1) women, in order, drawn from D. [1992] Uniform random preferences on both sides
Average rank of parter for side optimized for is log(n), n log(n) for the non-optimized side Ashlagi et al. [2013] Uniform random preferences on both sides, n men, n − 1 women Average rank for men's match n 3 log(n) , for women's match 3 log(n), in any stable matching Figure 1 : Related works with distributional assumptions on the preferences of one or both sides of the market. Under these assumptions, it is often possible to show that many agents have few (or one) stable partners. If an agent has zero or one stable partner, then she has no incentive to misreport.
Draw w i ∼ D until w i / ∈ {w 1 , . . . , w i−1 }. We denote such a distribution over preference lists by D k . Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] prove a generalization of a conjecture of Roth and Peranson [1999] , showing if the men draw their preference lists according to D k , the expected number of women with more than one stable match is o(n) (as n grows, for fixed k). Since it is known that a person has incentive to misreport only if they have more than one stable partner, this implies that only a vanishingly small fraction of the women will have incentive to misreport to any stable matching process. They also show that any stable matching algorithm induces a Nash equilibrium for which a 1 − o(1) fraction of players behave truthfully. These results are extended by Kojima and Pathak [2009] to the many-to-one matching setting. They show that student-optimal stable matchings, where colleges have arbitrary preferences, and the students have random preference lists of fixed length drawn as above, will have similar a subconstant fraction of schools which have incentive to misreport. Lee [2011] considers a slightly different distributional assumption about preferences in the one-to-one setting, where he shows that only a small number of players have large incentive to misreport. Azevedo and Budish [2012] introduce the notion of "strategyproofness in the large", and show that the Gale-Shapley algorithm satisfies this definition. Roughly, this means that fixing any (constant sized) typespace, and any distribution over that typespace, if player preferences are sampled i.i.d. from the typespace, then for any fixed η, as the number of players n tends to infinity, truthful reporting becomes an η-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium. These assumptions can be restrictive however -note that this kind of result requires that there are many more players than there are "types" of preferences, which in particular (together with the full support assumption on the type distribution) requires that in the limit, there are infinitely many identical agents of each type. In contrast, our results do not require a condition like this.
To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first to give truthfulness guarantees in settings where both sides of the market have worst-case preference orderings. Unlike some prior work, even without distributional assumptions, we are able to give truthfulness guarantees to every student, not only a 1 − o(1) fraction of students. Under one of the assumptions used in prior work (namely, that the length of the preference lists is short), our results can be sharpened as well.
Differential Privacy as a Tool for Truthfulness
The study of differentially private algorithms [Dwork et al., 2006] has blossomed in recent years. A comprehensive survey of the work in this area is beyond the scope of this paper; here, we mention the work which relates directly to the use of differential privacy in constructing truthful mechanisms.
McSherry and Talwar [2007] were the first to identify privacy as a tool for designing approximately truthful mechanisms. Nissim et al. [2012] showed how privacy could be used as a tool to design exactly truthful mechanisms without needing monetary payments (in certain settings). Huang and Kannan [2012] proved that the exponential mechanism, a basic tool in differential privacy introduced in McSherry and Talwar [2007] is maximal in distributional range, which implies that there exist payments which make it exactly truthful. Kearns et al. [2014] demonstrated a connection between private equilibrium computation and the design of truthful mediators (and also showed how to privately compute approximate correlated equilibria in large games). This work was extended by Rogers and Roth [2014] who show how to privately compute Nash equilibria in large congestion games.
The paper most related to our own is Hsu et al. [2014] which shows how to compute approximate Walrasian equilibria privately, when bidders have quasi-linear utility for money and the supply of each good is sufficiently large. In that paper, in the final allocation, every agent is matched to their approximately most preferred goods at the final prices. In our setting, there are several significant differences: first, in the Walrasian equilibrium setting, only agents have preferences over goods (i.e. goods have no preferences of their own), but in our setting, both sides of the market have preferences. Second, although there is a conceptual relationship between "threshold scores" in stable matching problems and prices in Walrasian equilibria, the thresholds do not play the role of money in matching problems, and there is no notion of being matched to an "approximately" most preferred school.
Preliminaries
Many-to-one Matching
A many-to-one stable matching problem consist of m schools U = {u 1 , . . . , u m } and n students A = {a 1 , . . . , a n }. Every student a has a preference ordering ≻ a over all the schools, and each school u has a preference ordering ≻ u over the students. Let P denote the domain of all preference orderings over schools (so each ≻ a ∈ P).
It will be useful for us to think of a school u's ordering over students A as assigning a unique 1 score score(u, a) to every student, in descending order (for example, these could be student scores on an entrance exam). Every school u has a capacity C u , the maximum number of students the school can accommodate. A feasible matching µ is a mapping µ : A → U ∪ ∅, which has the property each student a is paired with at most one school µ(a), and each school u is matched with 1 It is essentially without loss of generality that students are assigned unique scores. If not, we could break ties by a simple pre-processing step: add noise l k=1 2 −k b k to each student's score, where each b k is a random bit; if the scores are integral, the probability of having ties is 1/ poly(n) as long as l ≥ O(log(n)).
at most C u students: |µ −1 (u)| ≤ C u . For notational simplicity, we will sometimes simply write µ(u) to denote the set of students assigned to school u.
A matching is α-approximately stable if it satisfies Definition 2. When computing matchings, it will be helpful for us to think instead about computing admission thresholds t u for each school. A set of admission thresholds t ∈ R m ≥0 induces a matching µ in a natural way: every student a ∈ A is matched to her most preferred school amongst those whose admissions thresholds are below her score at the school. Formally, for a set of admissions thresholds t, the induced matching µ t is defined by:
We say that a set of admission thresholds s is feasible and α-approximately stable if its induced matching µ t (a) is feasible and α-approximately stable. Note that an α-stable matching is an exactly stable matching in a market in which schools have reduced capacity (where the capacity at each school is reduced by at most a (1 − α) factor).
Remark Definition 2 also implies that if a school u is under-enrolled by more than αC u , its admission score t u = 0. This means such a school is very unpopular and could not recruit enough students even without any admission criterion. We now introduce a notion of approximate school optimality, which our algorithm guarantees.
In words, a matching µ is school-dominant if for every school u, when comparing the set of students S 1 that u is matched to in µ but not in the school optimal matching µ ′ , and the set of students S 2 that u is matched to in the school optimal matching µ ′ , but is not matched to in µ, u strictly prefers every student in S 1 to every student in S 2 . (i.e. compared to the school optimal matching, a school may be matched to fewer students, but not to worse students.) We note that school-dominance alone is trivial to guarantee: in particular, the empty matching is school dominant. Only together with an upper bound on the number of empty seats allowed per school (for example, as guaranteed by α-approximate stability) is this a meaningful concept.
We want to give mechanisms that make it an approximately dominant strategy for students to report truthfully. We have to be careful about what we mean by this, since students a have ordinal preferences ≻ a , rather than cardinal utility functions v a : U → [0, 1]. We say that a cardinal utility function v a is consistent with a preference ordering ≻ a if for every u, u ′ ∈ U , u ≻ a u ′ if and only if v a (u) ≥ v a (u ′ ). We will say that a mechanism is η-approximately truthful for students if for every student, and every cardinal utility function v a consistent with truthful ≻ a , truthful reporting is an η-approximate dominant strategy as measured by v a .
Definition 4. Consider any randomized mapping M : P n → U n . We say that M is η-approximately dominant strategy truthful (or truthful) if for any vector of student preferences ≻∈ P n , any student a, any utility function v a : U → [0, 1] that is consistent with ≻ a , and any ≻ ′ a =≻ a , we have:
Note that this definition is very strong, since it holds simultaneously for every utility function consistent with student preferences. When η = 0 it corresponds to first order stochastic dominance.
Differential Privacy Preliminaries
Our tool for obtaining approximate truthfulness is differential privacy, which we define in this section. We say that the "private data" of each student a consists of both her preference ordering ≻ a ∈ P over the schools and the scores score(u, a) ∈ V assigned by the schools. A private database D ∈ (P × V) n is a vector of n student profiles, and D and D ′ are neighboring databases if they differ in no more than one student record. In particular, our matching algorithms take n student profiles as input and produce a set of admission scores as output (i.e., range R = V m ).
Definition 5 (Dwork et al. [2006] ). An (randomized) algorithm A : (P × V) n → R is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every pair of neighboring databases D, D ′ ∈ (P × V) n and for every set of subset of outputs S ⊆ R,
If δ = 0, we say that M is ε-differentially private.
Differentially Private Counters
The central privacy tool in our matching algorithm is the private streaming counter(for a more detailed discussion of differential privacy under continual observation, see Chan et al. [2011] and Dwork et al. [2010a] ) proposed by Chan et al. [2011] and Dwork et al. [2010a] . Given a bit stream σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ T ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} T , a streaming counter M(σ) releases an approximation to c σ (t) = t i=1 σ i at every time step t. Below, we define an accuracy property we will then use to describe the usefulness of these counters.
Definition 6. A streaming counter M is (τ, β)-useful if with probability at least 1 − β, for each
For the rest of this paper, let Counter(ε, T ) denote the Binary Mechanism of Chan et al. [2011] , instantiated with parameters ε and T . Counter(ε, T ) satisfies the following accuracy guarantee (further details may be found in Appendix A.2). Our mechanism uses m different Counters to maintain the counts of temporally enrolled students for all schools. The following theorem allows us to bound the error of each Counter through the collective sensitivity across all Counters.
Theorem 3. Suppose we have m bit streams such that the change of an agent's data affects at most k streams, and alters at most c bits in each stream. For any β > 0, the composition of m distinct Counter ε/2c 2kc ln(1/δ), T s is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and (α, β)-useful for
Algorithms Computing Private Matchings are Approximately Truthful
In this section, we prove the theorem which motivates the rest of our paper. Consider an algorithm M which takes as input student preferences ≻ and computes school thresholds s. If M is ε-differentially private, then the algorithm A(≻) which computes thresholds s = M (≻) and then outputs the induced matching µ s is ε-approximately dominant strategy truthful. Note that this guarantee holds independent of stability. For lack of space, we relegate the proof to Appendix B.
Theorem 4. Let M : P n → R m ≥0 be any (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism which takes as input n student profiles and outputs m school thresholds. Let A : R m ≥0 → U n be the mechanism which takes as input m school thresholds s, and outputs the corresponding matching A(s) = µ s . Then the mechanism A • M : P n → U n is (ε + δ)-approximately dominant strategy truthful.
The intuition behind this theorem is simple: if a mechanism is private, a student's report has almost no effect on the realization of the school thresholds; Given a fixed set of school thresholds, he can do no better than reporting truthfully, which causes him to be matched to his most preferred school that will take him.
Proof of Theorem 4. Fix any vector of student preferences ≻, any player a, any utility function v a consistent with ≻ a , and any deviation ≻ ′ a =≻ a . Now consider player a's utility for truth-telling. For ε ≤ 1, we have
where the first and last equalities follow from the definition of the induced matching µ s , the first inequality follows from the differential privacy condition, and the second follows from the consistency of v a with ≻ a .
Truthful School-Optimal Mechanism
In this section, we present the algorithm which proves our main result Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 computes an α-approximately stable and school-dominant matching, and enjoys approximate dominant strategy truthfulness for the student side. We assume the reader is familiar with DA-School, the well-known school-proposing version of the deferred acceptance algorithm [Gale and Shapley, 1962] . For a brief overview of DA-School within our context of score thresholds, see Section D. We now state a useful fact about deferred acceptance, whose proof can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 1. Let µ t be some matching which is an intermediate matching in a run of the schoolproposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Then µ t is school-dominant.
Our algorithm, Private-DA-School(ε, δ), is a private version of DA-School. At each time t, each school will publish a threshold score (initially, for each school, this will be the maximum possible score for that school). Schools will lower their thresholds when they are under capacity; as they do so, some students will tentatively accept admission and some will reject or leave for other schools. Initially, all students will be unmatched. For a given student a, as soon as a school lowers its threshold below the score a has there, a will signal to the mechanism which school is her favorite of those for which her score passes their threshold. Then, as the schools continue to lower their thresholds to fill seats, if a school that a likes better than her current match lowers its threshold below her score, a will inform the mechanism that she wishes to switch to her new favorite.
Each school maintains a private counter of the number of students tentatively matched to the school. We let E be the additive error bound of the counters. The schools will reserve E number of seats from their initial capacity to avoid being over-enrolled, so the algorithm is run as if the capacity at each school is C u − E. Then each school can be potentially under-enrolled by 2E seats, but they would take no more than α fraction of all the seats as long as the capacity C u ≥ 2E/α.
Algorithm 1: Private-DA-School(ε, δ)
Input: school capacities {C u }, student preferences {≻ a } and scores {score(u, a)}, range of scores [0, J] Output: a set of score thresholds {t j } initialize: for each school u j and each student a i
while there is some under-enrolled school u j : counter(u j ) < C u j and t u j > 0 do
Send 0 to all other counters else Send 0 to all counters return Final threshold scores {t j } and matching µ t Now, we state the formal version of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and hence (ε + δ)-approximately dominant strategy truthful. With probability at least 1 − β, it outputs an α-approximately stable, school dominant matching, as long as the capacity at each school u satisfies
We prove Theorem 1 in two parts. Lemma 2 shows that Private-DA-School(i, s) (ε, δ)-differentially private in the preferences of the students. Lemma 3 shows that the resulting matching is school-dominant so long as the capacity at each school is large enough. These two together imply Theorem 1 directly.
We relegate the proof of Lemma 2 to Appendix B for lack of space. The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Once a student leaves a school, it will never return to that school; thus, the sensitivity of all m counters to a given student is at most 2m. The proof formalizes the sense in which Private-DA-School(ε, δ) has sensitivity at most 2m to a particular student.
Lemma 3. With probability at least 1 − β, Private-DA-School(ε, δ) outputs an α-approximately stable, school-dominant matching, as long as the capacity at each school u satisfies
If the maximum error of each of the collection of counters is bounded by x with probability at least, 1 − β, we need only
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove that the output thresholds {t u j } induce an α-approximately stable, school-dominant matching µ t .
We claim that there can be no blocking pairs with filled seats in µ t . Suppose some student a i wishes to attend u j . Then, it is either the case that score(u j , a i ) ≥ t u j or score(u j , a i ) < t u j . In the first case, a i cannot block with u j : she could have gone to u j and chose a school she preferred to u j . In the second case, consider some a i ′ such that u j = µ t (a i ′ ); this implies score(u j , a i ′ ) ≥ t u j . Thus, score(u j , a i ′ ) > score(u j , a i ), so a i ′ ≻ u j a i , and a i doesn't block with a i ′ , so there are no blocking pairs with filled seats.
By Theorem 3 and union bound, we know that the error of all m counters over all time steps is bounded by E except with probability β, where
So, we condition on the event that all schools' counters are accurate within E throughout the run of Private-DA-School(ε, δ) for the remainder of our argument. We first claim that no school is over-enrolled in µ t . Consider the last time u j lowered its threshold to t u j . Let n u j denote the number of students tentatively matched to u j just prior to the final lowering of t u j . By definition, u j only lowers its threshold when Counter(u j ) < C u j = C u j −E, so
where the first equality is by definition, the first inequality comes from the fact that u j lowered its threshold, the third from the accuracy we've conditioned on from the counters, and the final from the fact that u j never again lowers its threshold. Thus, C u j ≥ |µ t (u j )|, and u j is not over-enrolled. Now, we show no school is under-enrolled by more than 2E, unless t u j = 0. When the algorithm terminates, each school u j either has a threshold t u j = 0 or
where the first equality comes from the conditional bound on the error of the counters, the second from the fact that the algorithm terminated, and the final one from the definition of C u j . Thus, |µ(u j )| ≥ C u j − 2E whenever t u j > 0, so no school is under-enrolled by more than an α-fraction of its seats so long as C u j ≥ 2E/α.
Finally, we show school dominance. We will now show that µ, the matching corresponding to the thresholds output by Private-DA-School(ε, δ), is also achieved by running DA-School on the same instance, and halting early. No school is over-enrolled, by our argument above, at any point during the run of the algorithm. So, each proposal made by u j would be a valid proposal to make in DA-School with full capacity. Thus, Private-DA-School(t, e) rminates with each school having made (weakly) fewer proposals than it would have in DA-School. Since each school makes its proposals in the same order (according to ≻ u j ), this implies that µ t is a matching that corresponds to some intermediate point in DA-School using with the same ordering of proposals. Thus, by Lemma 6, µ is school-dominant (and our argument is entirely parametric in E, so the second part of the claim follows directly). Now, we present the formal version Theorem 2. Without loss of generality, we can assume algorithm ignores students after they have accepted k or more schools' proposals.
Theorem 2.
Suppose each student has a preference list of length at most k. Then, SchoolProposing
, δ is (ε, δ)-private and thus ε + δ-approximately truthful. With probability at least 1 − β, it outputs an α-approximately stablem school-dominant matching, as long as the capacity at each school
. We relegate the formal proof of Theorem 2 to Section B; the intuition is simple enough after the proof of Theorem 1. When students have much shorter preference lists, this greatly reduces the sensitivity of the counters to a single student's responses (from Θ(m) to Θ(k), where k is the maximum length of the preference list). This allows us to more tightly concentrate the error from the counters while maintaining differential privacy.
Conclusions
In this paper we applied differential privacy as a tool to design a many-to-one stable matching algorithm with strong incentive guarantees for the student side of the market. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first work to show positive truthfulness results for the non-optimal side of the market, under worst-case preferences, for all participants on the non-optimal side of the market.
Additionally, although we have not focused on this, our algorithm also provides strong privacy guarantees to the students. Each student, upon learning the school thresholds (and hence the school that she herself is matched to) can learn almost nothing about either the preferences or scores of the other students (i.e. almost nothing about the preferences that the other students hold over schools, or the preferences that schools hold over the other students). Here "almost nothing" is the formal guarantee of differential privacy, which in particular implies that for every student a, no matter what her prior belief over the private data of some other student a ′ is, her posterior belief over a ′ s data would be almost the same in the two worlds in which a ′ participates in the mechanism, and in which she does not. These guarantees might themselves be valuable in settings in which the matching being computed is sensitive -e.g. when computing a matching between patients and drug trials, for example. 
A Privacy Analysis for Counters
Theorem 5 (Chan et al. [2011] ). For β > 0, Counter(ε, T ) is ε-differentially private with respect to a single bit change in the stream, and (α, β)-useful for
Chan et al. [2011] show that Counter(ε, T ) is ε-differentially private with respect to single changes in the input stream, when the stream is generated non-adaptively. For our application, we require privacy to hold for a large number of streams whose joint-sensitivity can nevertheless be bounded, and whose entries can be chosen adaptively. To show that Counter is also private in this setting (when ε is set appropriately), we first present a slightly more refined composition theorem.
A.1 Composition
An important property of differential privacy is that it degrades gracefully when private mechanisms are composed together, even adaptively. We recall the definition of an adaptive composition experiment due to Dwork et al. [2010b] .
Definition 7 (Adaptive composition experiment).
• Fix a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a class of mechanisms M.
• For t = 1 . . . T :
-The adversary selects two databases D t,0 , D t,1 and a mechanism M t ∈ M.
-The adversary receives
The "output" of an adaptive composition experiment is the view of the adversary over the course of the experiment. The experiment is said to be ε-differentially private if
and (ε, δ)-differentially private if
where V 0 is the view of the adversary with b = 0, V 1 is the view of the adversary with b = 1, and R is the range of outputs. Any algorithm that can be described as an instance of this adaptive composition experiment (for an appropriately defined adversary) is said to be an instance of the class of mechanisms M under adaptive T -fold composition.
A very useful tool to analyze private algorithms is the following theorem that allows us to analyze the "composition" of private algorithms.
Theorem 6 (Adaptive Composition Dwork et al. [2010b] ). Let A : U → R T be a T -fold adaptive composition 2 of (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms.
In particular, for any ε ≤ 1, if A is a T -fold adaptive composition of (ε/ 8T ln(1/δ), 0)-differentially private mechanisms, then A satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
For a more refined analysis in our setting, we now state a straightforward consequence of a composition theorem of Dwork et al. [2010b] .
Lemma 4 (Dwork et al. [2010b] ). Let ∆ ≥ 0. Under adaptive composition, the class of 
In other words, the privacy parameter of each mechanism should be calibrated for the total distance between the databases, over the whole composition. This is useful for analyzing the privacy of the counters in our algorithm, which collectively have bounded sensitivity.
A.2 Details for Counters
We reproduce Binary mechanism here in order to refer to its internal workings in our privacy proof.
First, it is worth explaining the intuition of the Counter. Given a bit stream σ : [T ] → {−1, 0, 1}, the algorithm releases the counts In this way, we can calculate the count t i=1 σ(i) by summing at most log t partial sums: let i 1 < i 2 . . . < i m be the indices of non-zero bits in the binary representation of t, so that
Therefore, we can view the algorithm as releasing partial sums of different ranges at each time step t and computing the counts is simply a post-processing of the partial sums. The core algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Counter(ε, T )
A.3 Counter Privacy under Adaptive Composition
Proof. The composition of m counters is essentially releasing a collection of noisy partial sums adaptively. We need to first frame this setting as an advanced composition experiment defined in Definition 7. First, we treat each segment σ[a, b] in a stream as a database. For each such database, we are releasing the sum by adding noise sampled from the Laplace distribution:
-private mechanism (w.r.t. a single bit change). We know that changing an agent's data changes at most c bits in each stream, and affects at most k streams, and also each construction, each school u j receives at most 2 nonzero bits from a given student, and no student's data creates more than 2m nonzero bits in all streams together. By Theorem 6 and Lemma 4, the composition of m Counter(ε ′ , nmJ) satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy when no stream has more than 2 bits affected by a single agent's data and no student has more than 2m total nonzero bits in any stream. Thus, M (and also Private-DA-School(ε, δ)) satisfies (ε, δ) differential privacy.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove (ε, δ)-privacy, which again reduces to proving (ε, δ)-differential privacy of the set of m counters. By a simple calculation, School-Proposing(
as the privacy parameter for the m counters it uses. Theorem 6 states that a collection of m Counter(ε ′ , nT ) with total sensitivity ∆ (and individual sensitivity c) satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy so long as
Remark 2 limits the total amount of sensitivity School-Propose will have; a student will be able to affect at most 2k bits in the input stream, so ∆ ≤ 2k, and at most 2 per school, so c ≤ 2. Thus, it suffices to use privacy parameter
so our algorithm is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, Theorem 6 and a union bound imply the maximum error any one of the counters will have at any time during the execution of the algorithm is
with probability 1 − β. Thus, by Lemma 3, we get the desired guarantee for α-approximate stability and school-dominance.
C Proofs of Matching Lemmas
We state one more lemma which we will use in the proofs of Lemmas 6.
Lemma 5. Consider a set P u of proposals made by each school u according to some prefix of school-proposing DA. Let P ⊆ A × U be the set of proposals made by all schools. Then, the matching µ which results from P is unique (and independent of the order in which proposals are made), assuming students are truthful.
Proof. Each student ultimately accepts her most preferred proposal among the set of proposals she has received, independent of their ordering. (i.e. admissions thresholds only descend, and she picks her most preferred school amongst those schools with thresholds below her scores). Thus, each school u will be matched to the subset of P u which finds u to be their favorite offer, independent of the order in which proposals were made.
Lemma 6. Let µ t be some matching which is an intermediate matching in a run of the schoolproposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Then µ t is school-dominant.
Proof. The school-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is somewhat underspecified. In particular, if multiple schools have space remaining, the order in which those schools make proposals isn't predetermined. But, by Lemma 5 shows that reordering of the same proposals from the schools will arrive at the same matching. Thus, it suffices to show, for a fixed ordering of the entire set of proposals made by DA, that each intermediate matching is school-dominant.
Let t denote the time at which we wish to halt a run of DA. Let P u,t denote the set of proposals which school u has made according some fixed ordering up to time t, and P u denote set of proposals made by school u according to the entire run of DA. Let µ t denote the "current" matching according to the first run of DA stopped at time t and µ denote the final outcome of DA.
Consider any school A. Notice that, since |P u | ≥ |P u,t |, by the definition of DA,
since, for a given school, the proposing order is just working down their preference list. Now consider a particular school u. We must show that for each a ∈ µ t (u)\µ(u), a ′ ∈ µ(u)\µ t (u), a ≻ u a ′ . If a was proposed to by u in P t and rejects u, then u will be rejected by a when she receives a superset P of proposals. Thus, the only students u has according to µ but not µ t are students z ∈ P u \P u,t (students who are proposed to after time t). But, by the definition of DA, if u proposes to two students a and a ′ , and proposes to a before a ′ , a ≻ u a ′ , as desired.
D A Reference to DA-School
In this section, we present DA-School, the well-known school-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm [Gale and Shapley, 1962] . In this setting, schools which are not at capacity propose to students one at a time, starting from their favorite students and moving down their preference list. When a student gets a proposal, if she is tentatively matched to some other school, she will reject the offer from whichever school she likes less and accept the offer from the school she likes better. At this point, she is tentatively matched to the school she likes better, and the other school will continue to make proposals to fill the seat offered to her. The version of the algorithm we present here is non-standard -it operates by having each school set an admissions threshold, which it decreases slowly -but is easily seen to be equivalent to the deferred acceptance algorithm. This version of the algorithm will be much more amenable to a private implementation, which we give next. When a school u lowers its threshold t u below the score of a student a at school u (score(u, a)), we say that school u has proposed to student a.
It is well-known that DA-School will output a school-optimal stable matching (in our notation, a 0-approximate school-dominant stable matching) [Roth, 1985] , assuming all players are truthful.
